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This paper extends the model of Engler et al. (2007) on the adjust-
ment of the US current account to a three-country world economy. This
allows an analysis of the differential impact of a reversal of the US cur-
rent account on Europe and Asia. In particular, the outcomes under dif-
ferent exchange rate policies are analysed. The main nding is that large
factor re-allocations from non-tradables to tradables will be necessary in
the US. The direction of factor re-allocation in Asia depends on whether
the "Bretton-Woods-II" regime of unilaterally xed or manipulated ex-
change rates in Asia is continued. If this is the case, the tradables sector
and the current account surplus will continue to grow even when the US
decit closes. The ip side of this result is that Europe will face a huge
real appreciation and an enormous current account decit. With oating
exchange rates worldwide, the impact on Europe will be limited while
Asia´s tradables sector will shrink.
JEL: E2, F32, F41.
Keywords: Global imbalances, US current account decit, dollar
adjustment, sectoral adjustment
1 Contact details: Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business and Economics, Boltzmannstr. 20, Room
232, 14195 Berlin, Germany, philipp.engler@fu-berlin.de. I thank Helge Berger for many helpful sug-
gestions. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
1
1 Introduction
Global current account positions have become remarkable in their size and congura-
tion in recent years. Looking at the size, the sum of decits has grown to almost 2%
of world GDP in 2006 (Figure 1)1, a gure unmatched in the history of international
economic integration. Hence, globalization is clearly at work. The decits have started
to decline since 2006, but aggregate surpluses have not. The question that ultimately
comes to commentators' minds is whether, and under which conditions, this develop-
ment will last or reverse and what the consequences of the possible scenarios might be.
These topics have been hotly debated in recent years.
Looking at the conguration, the single country contributing most (and almost en-
tirely from a global perspective when the euro-area is taken as an entity) to the "global
decit" is the United States while the creditor side is taken mainly by the oil exporters
and Asian economies. The US decit reached a peak of 1.6% of world GDP in both
2005 and 2006 but is expected to have shrunk by around one third to 1.1% in 2008.
This points to the critical dependence of the world economy on developments in a
single country. Not surprisingly, in recent analyses of current imbalances and its un-
winding that has now begun, the US economy and its role in the world economy took
center stage.































































This paper takes a three-country view of imbalances in which the United States,
1 Actual numbers would be even higher if individual countries were displayed rather than groups of coun-
tries, as in Figure 1. However, this categorization helps to focus on broader patterns of the current con-
guration.
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Asia and Europe add up to a hypothetical world economy. Therein, different rebal-
ancing scenarios are analyzed. In a related paper, Engler et al. (2007) extended the
analysis by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006) taking account of supply side changes, rather
than purely demand-switching in an endowment economy, through which the exchange
rate implications of a closing of the US current account are moderated. In particular, a
re-allocation of factors from non-tradable towards tradable goods sectors in the United
States and vice versa in the rest of the world is induced by the adjustment. With regard
to the United States, this would stop the last decade's trend towards an ever increas-
ing share of non-tradables in total output. This quantity adjustment severely reduced
the implied adjustment of real exchange rates in a two-country framework (the United
States and the rest of the world).
What this two-country-approach cannot capture is the differential impact on dif-
ferent regions in the hypothetical rest of the world, in particular under differential ex-
change rate policies in a rebalancing scenario. Many Asian central banks intervene
heavily in foreign exchange markets or x their currencies in order to keep their cur-
rencies undervalued relative to the US dollar, while the US dollar oats vis-à-vis other
industrialized countries' currencies. Hence, the relative exchange rate and quantity ad-
justments in different parts of the world are likely to be affected by such differential
policies.
The core result of this paper is that the effect of continuing interventions on the side
of Asian central banks severely shifts the burden of adjustment of a closing of the US
current account decit to Europe. In particular, the xed exchange rates, or in other
words, the joint depreciation of Asian currencies with the dollar vis-à-vis the euro,
result in a complete reversal of the sectoral adjustment in Asia in a rebalancing scenario
compared to a exible exchange rate scenario. Rather than reducing the relative size
of the tradables sector as in the case of exible exchange rates, it further increases it,
even more than in the case of an endowment economy. The ip side of this result
is that the European non-tradables sector needs to increase much more relative to the
tradables sector implying a large factor reallocation. This change in relative size of
sectors is much larger than in the case of xed supplies. Hence, European economies
will be tested severely in a rebalancing in which Asia keeps its peg vis-à-vis the US
dollar. For instance, countries with inexible labor markets might see an increase in
unemployment. And, both by implication and by assumption, Asia will build up a
massive current account surplus vis-à-vis Europe of up to 11% of US GDP.
The most recent developments in the world nancial system point to an unwinding
solution that is somewhere between the pure Bretton-Woods scenario and a scenario
under exible exchange rates. China has not abandoned its peg, while the Japanese
yen has appreciated signicantly. Although it is too early for an overall assessment,
a severe risk to the world economy consists in insufcient exibility in goods and
factor markets, in particular in many European countries. This might potentially lead
to large increases in unemployment and exert, in addition to the purely economic stress,
increased political pressure on the current world trade and nancial system.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical framework
used for the analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses the results for different adjust-
ment scenarios, and Section 4 concludes.
3
2 The Model
This paper extends the model in Engler et al. (2007) in a crucial dimension. Not only
does it introduce a supply side channel mitigating the exchange rate implications of
an unwinding of global imbalances, which is an extension to the Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2006) model. It also differentiates between regions in the "rest of the world". The
heterogeneity of the rest of the world is made explicit in a three-country setting as in
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), incorporating a "European" and an "Asian" economy as
well as the United States (denoted by E, A and U respectively). Thus, the effects of
a rebalancing on goods and factor markets can be assessed from the perspective of
countries/regions and which may follow different exchange rate policies.2
The experiment is to analyze the effects of a closing of the US current account
decit. What is implicitly assumed is that there are either policy-induced or nancial
market-induced changes relative to the current situation. It could be that Asian central
banks or nancial markets are no longer willing to nance the US decit. Hence, this
analysis does not rest on any particular explanation for the current situation, it rather
assumes that the stabilizing forces for the US decit no longer prevail.
The main contribution from this approach is that European goods and factor markets
will be severely tested if Asian central banks continue to x their US dollar exchange
rates under a rebalancing scenario, while European currencies continue to oat vis-à-
vis the US dollar. Real effective exchange rates continue to be less affected because of
the supply response, but the terms of trade change a lot more. The direction and extent
of the implied change in trade ows crucially depends on exchange rate regimes. A lack
of willingness in Asia to share the burden of the necessary trade adjustment shifts this
burden entirely to the European economies, thereby shrinking the European tradables
sector remarkably.
The model is built around standard supply and demand sides. Each region produces
a non-tradable and a tradable good with Cobb-Douglas production functions with labor
as the only input. Labor markets are assumed to be perfectly integrated within coun-
tries (but not between countries), hence labor ows freely between the tradables and
the non-tradables sectors and a single wage rate prevails within each country. Demand
functions are derived from CES consumption indexes and depend on the current ac-
count balances of the respective country. Hence the current accounts, dened as the
difference between tradables production and tradables consumption plus the income
balance, can be interpreted as budget constraints.
Equilibrium prices and quantities for given current account balances are computed
by equating supply and demand of each good. When two sets of equilibrium prices
and quantities are determined, each for a certain conguration of current accounts,
these sets of equilibrium prices and quantities can be compared and price and quantity
changes be calculated for the assumed change of current accounts. In particular, I
determine the changes of real exchange rates, the terms of trade, the relative price
2 These terms should not be taken too literally since in the calibration "Europe" is rather a group of
countries with exible exchange rates, which also contains a few non-European countries (Canada, Australia
and New Zealand). But since the European Union plus other European non-EU countries form by far the most
important block, the term "Europe" serves as a good proxy for the countries in this group.
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of non-tradables, relative non-tradables quantities and the relative tradables quantities
across countries.
Regarding relative supplies, I assume the same relative quantities as Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2005) in the original allocation (i.e., with the US current account decit), but
let them adjust together with relative prices in the simulations of changes in current
accounts. Using the same original allocation allows a direct comparison of results and
the impact of supply responses in a rebalancing scenario.
Because I assume a frictionless factor re-allocation between sectors, my results can
be regarded as a limiting case, just as the endowment economy assumed by Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2005) is a limiting case for complete inexibility on the supply side. Any
real world adjustment is likely to be somewhere between these two extremes, and the
closeness of actual results to the two extremes will be determined by a number of
factors that cannot be made explicit in the present framework. One important factor
will be time, that is, whether a nancial market crash makes a quick closing of the US
current account necessary leaving little time for factor and goods markets to adjust or
whether the adjustment occurs over a longer time span. Closely related is the degree of
factor market rigidities that will determine to what extent the re-allocation is possible
in a given time.
The demand side and the supply side are introduced below, then a general equilib-
rium is dened and determined.
2.1 The Demand Side
Each country's preferences for tradable and non-tradable goods are described by con-
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where CiT and CiN are consumption of tradables and non-tradables in region i respec-
tively,  is a weighting factor and  the elasticity of substitution between tradables and
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with  determining the degree of home-bias in tradables consumption in the United
States and Europe and  in Asia. The term 1    is a preference parameter for con-
sumption of Asia's tradable good in the United States and Europe and  is the elasticity
of substitution between the different goods in the indexes. This parameterization indi-
cates that the United States and Europe have identical preferences for Asia's tradable
good, while Asia gives equal weight to both the United States' and Europe's goods.
From these consumption indexes, standard price indexes can be derived. For overall
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with P iT and P iN denoting the price indexes of tradable goods and the price of the non-
tradable good in country i while the Pi's are the prices of the tradable goods produced
in region i. All prices are in terms of US dollars and the law of one price holds, that
is, each tradable good has the same price in all regions when expressed in the same
currency. However, purchasing power parity in terms of aggregate prices does not hold
because CPIs differ across regions.
Relative Prices Below, we need the terms of trade, the relative prices of non-
tradables and the real exchange rates. The bilateral terms of trade are dened as the






































where qi;j is the relative price of region j's consumption in terms of region i's con-
sumption.
Bilateral real exchange rates can be shown to be functions of the terms of trade and
the relative prices of non-tradables. For the special case of  = 13, these simplify to
qU;E =
"
1 U;E + (   ) + (1  )1 U;A





























Noticing that EU U;E =
PEN
PUN
, it is obvious that the relative inuence of the terms
of trade and the relative prices of non-tradables across countries is determined by the
weight of tradables and non-tradables consumption in the consumption index  and
1 . With a much greater weight for the latter as observed in most countries, changes
in bilateral real exchange rates are mainly driven by changes in relative prices of non-
tradables and to a lesser extent by changes in the terms of trade. Hence, a neglect of
non-tradables would be a severe drawback in an analysis of current account rebalanc-
ing.
Real effective exchange rates are weighted relative CPIs and can be expressed as



























In order to derive nominal exchange rates from the above exercise, further assump-
tions need to be made. Central banks can follow one of two possible strategies in
this framework, CPI-targeting (i.e., keeping the overall CPI-index constant over time),
or GDP-deator-targeting (i.e., keeping a weighted average of domestically produced
goods prices constant over time). In the rst case, nominal exchange rates move one
for one with real exchange rates. In the second case, one could specify monetary policy
by assuming that central banks x a geometric average of domestically produced trad-
ables and non-tradables. However, results are quantitatively not very different between
the two monetary policy regimes (CPI- and GDP-deator-targeting), thus there is also
no big difference between nominal and real exchange rates, no matter what policy I
assume. In the analysis below, I therefore only report results for real exchange rates
under the assumption of CPI-targeting.
Demand Functions Nominal demands for non-tradable goods, expressed as func-






























































































Walras' law determines the demand function for Asia's tradables.
Because these demand functions are expressed in terms of tradables consumption,
they can be related to the regions' current accounts. The current account of region
i, CU i, is dened as tradables output minus tradables consumption plus the income
balance, dened as the return r received on the region's net foreign assets F i. Hence,
for the United States and Europe we have
CAU = PUY
U




T   PET CET + rFE
From an accounting perspective, current accounts and stocks of net foreign assets need
to add up to zero globally, therefore
CAU + CAE + CAA = 0
and
FU + FE + FA = 0.
Consequently, for Asia's current account we have
CAA =    CAU + CAE = PAY AT   PAT CAT   r  FU + FE .
Using these denitions and normalizing all demand functions by the US tradable
output PUY UT we get the ve equations shown in Appendix A. They fully describe the
demand side of the model. Next, I determine the supply side.
2.2 The Supply Side
The supply side is introduced by simple Cobb-Douglas production functions for the six
goods with labor as the only input,






for i = T;N and for j = U;E;A
with Aji and L
j
i denoting total factor productivity and labor input in region j's sector
i while  is labor's marginal productivity. The nested case of a xed supply is  = 0
while  = 1 denotes the constant returns case. Labor is assumed to be mobile across
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sectors within regions but immobile across regions. Hence, a single nominal wage rate
!j , expressed in terms of US dollars, exists for each region j. For simplicity, total labor
input in region j, Lj = LjT + L
j
N , is assumed to be constant over time.








































Hence, the relative supply of non-tradables is a positive function of its relative price
and relative total factor productivities.

































Because of differing wages across countries, bilateral relative tradables supply is, in
addition to the terms of trade and relative total factor productivities, also a function of























































The supply side is fully described by the relative supply functions (1) through (5) and
the relative wage equations (6) and (7).
2.3 General Equilibrium
In a general equilibrium, goods markets clear in the six markets. For deriving equi-
librium conditions, we only need to equate relative demand and supply relations. By
doing so, we derive solutions for all relative prices and relative quantities, which are
calculated for given current account positions. The resulting equations (shown in Ap-
pendix B) and the relative wage equations (6) and (7) describe the general equilibrium.
3 Rebalancing of the US Current Account
Having set up the model, it can now be used for simulations of different scenarios in
which the US current account decit is closed. The modelling strategy is to compute
two equilibria for every scenario, one with the original global imbalances in which the
United States have a current account decit, and one for which these imbalances are
reduced. In most cases, all current accounts are set to zero. Then, the percent changes
of relative prices and quantities are computed.
After explaining the calibration of the model in Section 3.1, results are summarized
along two dimensions. The rst dimension, discussed in Section 3.2, relates to the
comparison with the results presented in Obstfeld and Rogoff, the benchmark with
no supply adjustment4. The second dimension, presented in Section 3.3, relates to the
comparison between the two possible exchange rate regimes: the "Global Rebalancing"
regime where all exchange rates are freely oating and the "Bretton-Woods-II" regime
in which Asia pegs its exchange rate to the US dollar.5 In a snapshot, results for these
two dimensions are summarized in Figures 2-5, while detailed results are presented in
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix C.
The two main results from this analysis are (1) that the supply adjustment reduces
the exchange rate implications of the re-balancing, thereby shifting the burden of ad-
justment towards the real economy, while (2) the choice of the exchange rate regime
4 Note that most of Obstfeld and Rogoff's results include valuation effects, that is, the effects of exchange
rate changes on the stocks and ows of gross assets and liabilities. These valuation effects, in turn, inuence
the amount of required trade and price adjustment. It turns out, however, that assuming quite plausible
interest rate changes, in particular a reduction in the "exorbitant privilege" (the lower interest rate paid
on US liabilities relative to the interest rate received from foreign asset holdings), has the opposite effect of
the valuation changes. Hence, these two extensions may well offset each other completely. Therefore,
I do not analyse these additional effects and concentrate on the supply side effects.
5 See Dooley et al. (2003, 2004a-c, 2005a-b) and Caballero et al. (2006, 2007) for discussions about
an exchange rate peg or the stable exchange rates between the United States and Asian economies.
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has important implications for the burden sharing between different regions. In par-
ticular, Europe is likely to bear the brunt of this burden if Asia keeps its peg with the
dollar.
Alongside the main specications, a number of extensions are discussed. First, the
sensitivity of the adjustment to the size of the required change of the current account
positions is analyzed (Table 1). This is done by showing results for the case of a re-
duction to one half of the original current account positions (rather than setting them
to zero as in the benchmark scenario). Second, the sensitivity of the adjustment to the
time over which this adjustment needs to occur is highlighted (Table 2). This is done
by increasing the elasticities of substitution between different goods. This modelling
approach can be justied by assuming that with more time to adjust, more substitu-
tions in response to relative price changes are possible, which can be captured by a
larger elasticity of substitution. And nally, the role of a growing Asian labor force is
discussed.
3.1 Calibration
In order to make results comparable with the benchmark model in Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2005), parameters are chosen as in their framework. However, since the time frame
involved in a supply adjustment is likely to be larger and hence elasticities larger than
in an abrupt rebalancing, bigger elasticities are discussed as well.
The most important parameters are the elasticities of substitution between tradable
goods and non-tradable goods, , and between tradable goods from different countries,
. Most studies nd relatively low values for , usually between 0.5 and 1 (see Men-
doza, 1991 and Stockman and Tesar, 1995). I follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) who
chose  = 1 at the upper end of this range to capture the short term adjustment sce-
nario, but I also report results for  = 2 in order to capture longer periods in which
adjustment might take place. In the benchmark specication, I choose  = 2 which
is in the middle range of values usually employed and  = 4 for the slow adjustment
scenario.
The share of tradables consumption in total consumption, , is set to 0.25, a value
that corresponds roughly with the OECD average of tradable output share (Engler et
al., 2006). Therefore, the relative quantities of non-tradables and tradables are set to 3
in all regions in the initial allocation. The relative tradables quantities across regions
are set to 1, and ,  and  are set to 0.7, 0.8 and 0.7 respectively. Hence, all regions
have an equal home-bias in tradables consumption of 0.76 while the United States and
Europe weigh Asia's tradables somewhat more than Asia weighs their exports. This
implies that Asia is assumed to play an important role in world trade.
The elasticity of output with respect to the factor input, , is the critical parame-
ter that distinguishes this framework from Obstfeld and Rogoff's benchmark. In that
benchmark, this parameter takes on the value of 0, which does not allow any supply
adjustment. The results of this benchmark are compared with results when supply is
allowed to adjust. As a standard value I choose  = 0:7, which roughly corresponds to
6 This value is slightly smaller than the one discussed for OECD countries in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).
However, I followObstfeld and Rogoff (2005) with their choice in order to guarantee comparabilita of results.
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the US labor share. As a robustness check, I present the constant returns to scale case
where  = 1 for some specications.
The US current account relative to its own tradable output, caU , is assumed to be
-0.2 in the original allocation from which the adjustment begins. Assuming a tradables
share of about 25% in total GDP, this implies a current account to GDP ratio of -0.05.
This corresponds to a little less than the actual gure in 2007.
An important element of this model are the relative total labor inputs L
i
Lj . Note that
although initially one may view this term as endogenous because changes in hours are
likely to occur in an adjustment process, consistency requires treating it as constant
in the framework I apply. As I abstract from consumers' and workers' intertemporal
optimization decisions, I hold total real consumption and total real output constant, and
adjust only relative quantities. Hence, total labor supply needs to be constant, too. This
allows analyzing sectoral adjustment without modeling total demand and supply.
Two aspects matter for my choice of population gures. First, data on hours worked
is available for OECD countries, but not for most developing countries. Hence, rela-
tive hours can only be proxied, at least for the US-Asia relationship. Therefore, I use
World Development Indicators data of the World Bank on relative populations for all
three regions in order to guarantee consistency. In the "European" labor force, I in-
clude the European Union, Turkey, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
The rationale for this choice is that Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) include the later four
countries for their determination of portfolio shares and because Turkey can well be
regarded as part of the wider European economy with its decades old currency union
with the European Union. Having exible exchange rates, this group of countries is
likely to be affected similarly in a rebalancing scenario and differentially vis-à-vis the
Asian economies, many of which stabilize nominal exchange rates and thereby add to
the burden of adjustment on the "European" side.
Second, major Asian countries have a huge share of rural populations which may
not be considered as a part of the population relevant for the modern economy and
in which substitution between tradable and non-tradable sectors occurs. In the case
of China and Thailand, the shares of the urban populations are as low as 44% and
24% respectively in 2007. Hence, I adjust the developing Asian economies' population
gures by considering only urban populations. The countries included are China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore,
furthermore Taiwan and Hongkong. In order to guarantee consistency, I use urban
populations for Europe and the United States as well. It turns out, however, that results
are not very sensitive to the exact gure.
In a robustness check, I want to grasp the current population dynamics in Asian
societies with a rapid growth of urban populations of up to 4.4% in case of Indonesia
and 3.6% in China. This changes the relative population gures over time and therefore
the results of the supply adjustment simulations. I provide simulation results only for
the longer adjustment scenarios where I computed the changing urban populations over
a ve-year horizon beginning in 2005, assuming the average annual growth rates of the
time between 1990 and 2004. The resulting gures can thus be regarded as projections
of relative urban populations in the year 2010.
The model requires values of relative total factor productivities. These are deter-
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mined for the initial allocation and then assumed to be constant over time. Hence, I
abstract from differential productivity developments across sectors and countries over
time. For exogenous initial relative outputs and endogenously determined relative









Other relative total factor productivities are calculated accordingly.
For the international investment positions, the currency denominations thereof and
interest return on them I follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005). They assume the "exor-
bitant privilege" with 3.75% interest paid on US dollar denominated assets and 5% on
assets denominated in all other currencies. These gures are somewhat smaller than
the post-war historical average (Gourinchas and Rey, 2006).
3.2 The Global Rebalancing Scenario
The rst dimension of the results, the global rebalancing scenario in which all current
accounts are reduced to zero, is shown in Table 1 and highlighted in Figure 2 for the real
exchange rates. The depreciation of the US dollar falls from 38.1% to 27.5% (for  =
0:7) and 23% (for  = 1) respectively when the supply side is allowed to adjust (All
values shown are percent changes and calculated as log differences between the initial
and the nal allocations.). Asia's appreciation, in turn, is signicantly reduced, from
24% to 16.7% and 13.5% while Europe's appreciation, already mild without supply
response, is further reduced as well.
This reduced real depreciation is achieved through somewhat larger terms of trade
deteriorations of the United States vis-à-vis Asia and Europe (Figure 3) and a much
lower change in the relative non-tradables prices. The larger change in the terms of
trade may appear counter-intuitive at rst sight. However, in order for a greater quantity
of tradable output to be sold in the world market, a greater price change is necessary.
This greater terms of trade change per se contributes to a larger real depreciation of the
US dollar, but this effect is more than offset by the reduced change of the relative price
of non-tradables, which has a much bigger weight in real exchange rates than the terms
of trade due to the large share of non-tradables in the consumption indexes. This un-
derlines the importance of non-tradables in an analysis of current account adjustments
and the determination of real exchange rates.
The relative non-tradables price change is a decreasing function of . The decline
of the US relative non-tradables price falls from -18.5% ( = 0) to -5.6% ( = 0:7)
and to basically zero for  = 1. In this latter case the entire adjustment occurs through
the quantity adjustment.
The quantity adjustment, in turn, is an increasing function of  (see Table 1). The
relative quantity of the US non-tradables falls by 13% while it increases by 4.3% and
11.4% in Europe and Asia.
Allowing for price and quantity adjustments does not change the nominal impact
(price plus quantity change) compared with the price only adjustment. In case of the
US, the fall of the relative size of the non-tradables sector is 18.5% in all three speci-
cations. However, the specications introduced here highlight the important role of a
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Figure 2: Change of REER (in %, short term)
























sectoral re-allocation of production factors. Note that in these specications the least
affected region in terms of quantity adjustment is Europe, where the required sectoral
re-allocation is extremely low. This will change dramatically in the Bretton-Woods-II
scenario.
The relative tradables quantities across regions change remarkably as well. The
European and the Asian tradable outputs relative to the US tradables output contracts
by 13.1% and 18.3% respectively for  = 0:7 and by 18.6% and 26.3% respectively
for  = 1. Thus, the European and the Asian exporters suffer from the adjustment in
the global rebalancing scenario.
The fourth, fth and sixth columns of Table 1 report results for a simulation as
above with the only difference that all current accounts are reduced to half their original
values, to -0.1 and to 0.025 for the United States and Europe respectively. Here, the
price and quantity changes are reduced by half as well, hence percentage changes of
endogenous variables are proportional to the needed adjustment analyzed.
In order to analyze an adjustment scenario that occurs over an extended period, the
rst part of Table 2 presents simulations where the elasticities of substitution between
goods are doubled,  is set to 2 and  now equals 4.
In all specications this reduces the percentage changes proportionally by a little
more than 50%. The difference between the US real effective exchange rate change
in the specications with and without supply adjustment is less than above but still
signicant. Asia's and Europe's adjustment in terms of their respective real exchange
rates is quite modest here. However, large factor re-allocations remain necessary in
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Figure 3: Change of bilateral terms of trade (in %, short term)





















both the United States and Asia, indicated by the percentage changes of the relative
quantities of non-tradables of around 8%. Europe, on the other hand, remains almost
unaffected with an increase of the non-tradables to tradables ratio (Y EN =Y ET ) of 2.6%.
Again, this result will turn out to be sensitive to the choice of the exchange rate regime.
The effect of changing relative labor forces is highlighted by a comparison between
the second and third columns. In the third column, a change of relative populations is
assumed, taking account of the trend of a rapidly increasing urban population in Asia.
Taking this less literally, one could regard this as an analysis of the rapid absorption
of the rural Chinese population by the expanding industrial sector. In the global rebal-
ancing scenario, the change in the set-up only has a small impact on relative prices and
the relative non-tradable quantities. However, the changes of relative tradables output
across regions are remarkable. While in the case of constant populations, Europe´s
tradables sector grows relative to Asia's (Y AT =Y ET falls by 3.8%), this ratio increases
by 5.9% when population changes are introduced. The gains of the US tradables sector
vis-à-vis Asia's tradables sector are reduced and, interestingly, Europe's tradables pro-
duction falls even more relative to that of the United States. Hence, due to the Asian
population dynamics, European exporters bear a greater burden in an adjustment sce-
nario. The intuition behind this result is that, ceteris paribus, Asia's relative wages
fall (see the wage equations in Section 3.2), resulting in a shufing of the burden of
adjustment away from Asia and towards Europe.
3.3 The Bretton-Woods-II scenario
The dramatically different results for a "Bretton-Woods-II" scenario are presented in
the second part of Table 1. Here, Asia's central banks keep their bilateral real exchange
rates vis-à-vis the United States xed. The burden of adjustment on the surplus-side is
handed over entirely to Europe, which now experiences a real appreciation of almost
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60% vis-à-vis both the United States and Asia for  = 0:7 (see also Figure 2) and
somewhat less for  = 1. At the same time, this effect is again muted through the
quantity adjustment.
The change in the terms of trade between the United States and Asia is now quite
modest while the gains in competitiveness of both the United States and Asia vis-à-vis
Europe are large. The United States' and Asia's terms of trade fall by about 50% (for
 = 0:7) and about 60% (for  = 1), compared with about 30% when only prices
adjust (see also Figure 3).
The weaker US and Asian currencies result in a strong deterioration in Europe's ex-
port performance. Compared with the Global Rebalancing scenario, Europe's relative
to the US tradables output falls by more than 30% for  = 0:7 rather than 13% (see
also Figure 4) and by more than 50% for  = 1. In Asia, the tradables sector continues
to grow, a little vis-à-vis the United States and to an enormous extent vis-à-vis Europe.

























This picture is reinforced by the change of the non-tradable to tradable output ratio.
As can be seen in Figure 5, the "burden sharing" between Europe and Asia, with a
somewhat bigger burden borne by the Asian economies in the Global Rebalancing
scenario, changes completely: the ratio increases by 28.3% in Europe, while it falls by
23.5% in Asia for  = 0:7 and even more for  = 1. Thus, under a Bretton-Woods-
II scenario, the burden of adjustment in the real economy is handed over entirely to
Europe.
Europe's current account surplus of 5% of US tradables output turns into a decit of
almost 43%, which is roughly 11% of US GDP (not shown in the table) and a surplus
of equal size in Asia. Hence, global imbalances move from one region to another and
aggravate by an enormous extent. This would be a truly alarming scenario for the
European economies.
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In the last two columns of Table 1, results for the Bretton-Woods-II setup are pre-
sented with the US current account reduced to one half of its original decit. Like
under a Global Rebalancing, this reduces the adjustment of all variables by roughly
one half. Hence, the amount by which the US decit is required to fall matters greatly
for the amount of stress it creates for the European economy.
Changing the time horizon of the adjustment has similar effects as in the Global
Rebalancing scenario (see Table 2). All effects are smaller, but in this case the changing
population size only has a small impact on relative tradables output.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple but exible theoretical framework that allows a number of
specications under which a rebalancing of the US current account decit can be ana-
lyzed. The precise way of modelling the reversal is to simply assume that the current
account needs to shrink by a certain amount over a given period of time. This required
adjustment is exogenous in this model, it may be due to some exogenous change in
market sentiment towards the United States.
Three aspects are novel to this approach: First, the model captures a three-country
world. The differential impact on Europe and Asia is highlighted, rather than only the
impact of a reversal of the US current account on the rest of the world as a whole, as
in Engler et al. (2007). Second, the supply side is introduced. Hereby, the sectoral re-
allocations within countries and across countries are shown, an aspect neglected in the
three country model in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005). Third, the impact of an increasing
Asian workforce on the re-balancing scenario is captured through its effect on relative
18
wages.
The core result is that exchange rate policies matter for the distribution of the burden
of adjustment. While under exible exchange rates Europe will hardly be affected
by the adjustment, a stabilization of Asian exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar will
exert massive pressure on Europe's tradables sector. European tradables output will not
only contract strongly relative to the US tradables output, but also, to a similar extent,
relative to Asian tradables output. In the baseline parameterization, this contraction is
more than 30%. The supply adjustment does relieve pressure from European exchange
rates, that is, reducing the real appreciation, but the implications for the real economy
will be devastating if Asian economies do not let their currencies appreciate against
the dollar. The ip side of this contraction of the European tradables sector is that the
relative size of the non-tradables sector will grow considerably. In the logic of this
model, this requires a re-allocation of production factors.
The simulation results reveal a crucial inuence of several key parameters and as-
sumptions on the relative burdens of adjustment each country has to bear. First, demand
elasticities matter. The smaller the elasticities of substitution between goods are, the
greater the implications for exchange rates and factor re-allocation. Since typical esti-
mates for these elasticities are small, the risks implied by the closing of the US current
account are indeed signicant. However, if one interprets larger elasticities as parame-
terizations of longer term adjustment scenarios, the risks might not be as severe as the
benchmark specication suggests.
Second, size matters. The more the US decit needs to shrink, the greater the
needed adjustment. It follows that if the US decit needs to shrink only partially, there
is also less to worry about factor re-allocation.
Third, size also matters along another dimension which so far has not been high-
lighted in the literature: relative populations. The increasing Asian workforce tends to
reduce its relative wages and increase its competitiveness. In an adjustment scenario
this allows Asia to shift a part of the burden of adjustment towards Europe, whose
tradables sector is further suppressed.
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Appendix A.
The bilateral real exchange rates in the general case of  6= 1 are
qU;E =
h
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with fU = FU=PUY UT , caU = CAU=PUY UT , fE = FE=PUY UT and caE =
CAE=PUY
U
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Table 2: Current account rebalancing in the medium run
Global Rebalancing Bretton-Woods-II
 = 0  = 0:7  = 0:7  = 0  = 0:7  = 0:7
REER U 16.9 12.9 12.3 10.5 9.2 9.3
E -2.2 -2.0 -3.2 -31.6 -27.6 -27.7
A -11.0 -8.1 -6.9 15.8 13.8 13.9
bilateral RER U-E 14.3 11.2 11.6 31.5 27.6 27.8
U-A 18.2 13.7 12.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
E-A 3.8 2.5 1.1 -31.6 -27.6 -27.8
Terms of Trade U-E 7.1 8.5 8.9 16.0 21.1 21.3
U-A 7.4 9.6 8.2 3.2 1.9 1.1
E-A 0.3 1.1 -0.7 -12.8 -19.1 -20.2
Relative tradable U-E 0.0 -8.4 -11.0 0.0 -20.7 -23.3
output U-A 0.0 -12.2 -5.1 0.0 3.9 9.7
E-A 0.0 -3.8 5.9 0.0 24.6 33.1
Relative price of U -8.2 -3.7 -3.7 -8.2 -3.7 -3.8
non-tradables E 2.5 1.1 1.0 14.8 7.9 7.8
A 7.4 3.3 3.4 -12.2 -6.3 -5.4
Relative non- U 0.0 -8.5 -8.6 0.0 -8.7 -8.8
tradable output E 0.0 2.6 2.4 0.0 18.3 18.2
A 0.0 7.8 8.0 0.0 -14.7 -12.5
Note: The European current account decits in the three Bretton-Woods-II
scenarios are 35.5%, 39.1% and 38.2%
 Simulations with changing relative populations.
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